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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Youngman entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of trafficking in heroin
while preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Youngman
contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because he was
unlawfully arrested without probable cause or a warrant, and controlled substances were
discovered only after he was searched pursuant to his unlawful arrest. Due to the unlawful
arrest, Mr. Youngman submits that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress.
As such, this Court should reverse the order denying the motion to suppress and suppress the
controlled substances found as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 19, 2020, at around 7:56 p.m., Sergeant Justin Klitch pulled over a gold
Ford Explorer for “Failing to Signal, Failure to Maintain Lane, Following too Closely,
Insufficient Muffler, and Obstructed Rear License Plate.”1 (R., p.28; see Tr. Vol. II,2 p.14,
L.17—p.16, L.13.) After Sergeant Klitch stopped the vehicle, he made contact with the driver of
that vehicle, Justin Youngman. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.3-13, p.18, Ls.3-8.) Mr. Youngman
1

Specifically, Sergeant Klitch noted that:
Prior to stopping the Ford, I observed the driver merge onto westbound Interstate 90 at
the 11 On-Ramp without using a left turn signal. I caught up to the Ford and observed
the driver drive over the white solid fog line failing to maintain lane. The driver was also
following another vehicle at a close distance, following too closely. The rear license
plate was obstructed by a ball hitch, which rendered the license plate unreadable. I could
hear noises coming from the Ford as if it were not equipped with a muffler.”
(R., p.28.)
2
Citations to the transcripts refer to the electronic document titled “Transcript- Volume 1.” That
electronic document contains the transcripts for both the preliminary hearing and motion to
suppress hearing held in this case. Citations to “Tr. Vol. I” will refer to the preliminary hearing
transcript. Citations to “Tr. Vol. II” will refer to the page and line numbers listed for the motion
to suppress hearing transcript beginning on page 57 of the electronic document.
1

informed the officer that he did not have a driver’s license on his person at that time. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.24, Ls.12-18; Defendant’s Exhibit A1,3 ~19:59:04—19:59:15.)

During this initial

encounter, Mr. Youngman disclosed that his license was suspended for unpaid fines.
(Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:00:20.)
When Sergeant Klitch began speaking with Mr. Youngman, the officer noted that
“Mr. Youngman had extremely rapid speech. He was talking so fast it was almost hard to
understand him. Um, he – he was making jerky movements within the vehicle. He had glassy,
bloodshot eyes. He had dilated pupils.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, L.18—p.19, L.6.) Based on the
officer’s observations, Sergeant Klitch had Mr. Youngman exit his vehicle and began asking
Mr. Youngman about drug use. (Tr. Vol. II, p.19, Ls.4-14.) After Mr. Youngman denied any
recent drug use, the officer began conducting field sobriety tests on Mr. Youngman. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.19, Ls.7-14.)
Sergeant Klitch had Mr. Youngman perform the modified Romberg test to determine
how closely Mr. Youngman could estimate the passage of thirty seconds of time. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.19, Ls.7-14, p.22, L.23—p.24, L.1.) Sergeant Klitch noted that Mr. Youngman conducted the
3

Prior to the motion to suppress hearing, defense counsel submitted three DVDS with the district
court. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.14-17.) The parties stipulated to the admission of those DVDS, each
of which contained a separate video file. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.18—p.5, L.19.) The videos were
collectively admitted as “Defendant’s Exhibit A.” (R., p.145; Tr. Vol. II, p.83, L.21—p.84,
L.13.) To avoid confusion when referring to each video, appellate counsel labels each of the
videos separately herein. One of the videos, cited herein as Defendant’s Exhibit A1”, is an
approximately twenty-five minute recording of Sergeant Klitch’s dash camera footage beginning
from the time that Sergeant Klitch begins following Mr. Youngman’s vehicle. (R., p.145.)
Another one of the videos, cited herein as “Defendant’s Exhibit A2”, is a brief video from
Officer Amy Knisley’s body-worn camera footage. The third video, cited herein as
“Defendant’s Exhibit A3”, is a brief video of Sergeant Klitch’s dash camera footage that begins
approximately twelve minutes after the conclusion of the footage from Defendant’s Exhibit A1.
Both Defendant’s Exhibit A1 and Defendant’s Exhibit A2 have been supplemented to this Court
as part of a motion to augment filed contemporaneously with this brief. Where applicable,
citations to the video exhibit will identify the relevant time stamp on the video. If quotations to
the video are necessary, they are reproduced to the best of appellate counsel’s ability.
2

Romberg test in sixteen seconds. (Tr. Vol. II, p.23, L.1—p.24, L.1.) While the Romberg test
was being conducted, Sergeant Klitch also observed “what appeared to be a hypodermic needle
mark” on Mr. Youngman’s arm and that Mr. Youngman had eyelid flutters during the Romberg
test. (Tr. Vol. II, p.23, Ls.1-9.) After the Romberg test, Sergeant Klitch returned to his vehicle
and performed a check on the status of Mr. Youngman’s driver’s license. (Tr. Vol. II, p.24,
Ls.12-25.)
While waiting on the license check, Sergeant Ronald Sutton arrived to assist Sergeant
Klitch. (Tr. Vol. II, p.25, Ls.3-5.) Sergeant Klitch requested that Sergeant Sutton have a chat
with Mr. Youngman because Sergeant Klitch was “pretty sure” that Mr. Youngman was “high”.
(Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:03:55—20:04:02.) When Sergeant Sutton returned after speaking
with Mr. Youngman, Sergeant Sutton informed Sergeant Klitch that Mr. Youngman “could be,
or it could just be that he’s just not all there. One or the other. He can hold a conversation with
me.” (Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:05:45—20:06:02.)
Mr. Youngman’s driving privileges came back as suspended out of the state of
Washington. (Tr. Vol. II, p.24, L.22—p.25, L.20; Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:06:03.) When
Sergeant Klitch approached Mr. Youngman again after running the license information through
dispatch, the officer asked Mr. Youngman for consent to search Mr. Youngman’s vehicle.
(Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:07:03; Tr. Vol. II, p.28, L.23—p.29, L.3.)

Mr. Youngman

declined to give the officer consent to search his vehicle. (Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:07:03;
Tr. Vol. II, p.28, L.23—p.29, L.3.)
Sergeant Klitch then informed Mr. Youngman that he was going to administer field
sobriety tests because he suspected that Mr. Youngman was under the influence “of something.”
(Defendant’s Exhibit A1, ~20:07:14.) Sergeant Klitch told Mr. Youngman that he did not

3

“suspect alcohol here” and that he did not “suspect alcohol at all.” (Defendant’s Exhibit A1,
~20:08:05—20:11:10.) Sergeant Klitch administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on
Mr. Youngman, and the officer only found two out of six clues of impairment.4 (Tr. Vol. II,
p.26, L.21—p.27, L.18.) As for the other field sobriety tests, Sergeant Klitch testified that he,
“attempted to have Mr. Youngman conduct the walk-and-turn, which he refused to complete.
Mr. Youngman also refused to complete the one-leg stand, and he also refused to recite his
alphabet or conduct a counting test.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.28, Ls.5-10.)
Sergeant Klitch arrested Mr. Youngman for driving under the influence after
Mr. Youngman declined to participate in further field sobriety testing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.1417.) After Sergeant Klitch arrested Mr. Youngman, the officer searched Mr. Youngman incident
to that arrest. (Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.18-20.) During that search, the officer “found a clear bag
containing a small amount of a brown tarry substance which [he] recognized to be heroin.”
(Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.21-24.)
Sometime thereafter, Officer Amy Knisley arrived at the traffic stop and ran her drug dog
around Mr. Youngman’s vehicle. (Tr. Vol. II, p.65, L.13—p.66, L.1.) The drug dog alerted on
Mr. Youngman’s vehicle after the drug dog climbed onto Mr. Youngman’s vehicle and stuck its
nose a couple of inches inside of the open driver’s side window. (Tr. Vol. II, p.68—p.70, L.11;
see Defendant’s Exhibit A2 and Defendants Exhibit A3.) Mr. Youngman’s vehicle was searched
after the drug dog alerted. (Tr. Vol. II, p.70, Ls.9-14.)
Sergeant Sutton and Officer Knisley searched Mr. Youngman’s vehicle after the drug dog
alerted. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.18-21.) During the search of the vehicle, Officer Knisley found a
long rubber glove that contained plastic bags inside. (Tr. Vol. I, p.7, Ls.19-23.) According to
4

Specifically, the clues that Sergeant Klitch found were that Mr. Youngman lacked smooth
pursuit in both eyes during the test. (Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.21—p.27, L.18.)
4

Sergeant Klitch, the glove “contained a clear bag which contained more bags and more heroin
and suspected methamphetamine.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.6-10.) Some of the items tested came
back as containing heroin, while one of the other items tested came back as containing both
heroin and methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.10—p.24, L.14; see Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15.)
The State eventually filed a second amended criminal complaint charging Mr. Youngman
with trafficking in heroin, possession of methamphetamine, driving under the influence of an
intoxicating substance, and being a persistent violator.

(R., pp.58-60.)

Mr. Youngman

subsequently filed a motion to suppress, arguing that: (1) “Sergeant Klitch unlawfully prolonged
the traffic stop in this case when he abandoned his purpose for the stop and began a DUI
investigation”; (2) Officer Knisley allowed her K-9 to conduct an actual search on
Mr. Youngman’s vehicle because “officer Knisley and her K-9 did ‘physically intrude’ on
Mr. Youngman’s ‘effects’ when the K-9 jumped on Mr. Youngman’s vehicle and even stuck its
head inside the vehicle”; and (3) “Mr. Youngman’s warrantless arrest was unlawful because
officer Klitch lacked probable cause to believe that Mr. Youngman’s ability to drive was
impaired by drugs or alcohol.” (R., pp.94-103.)
The district court issued a notice of intent to take judicial notice of all documents in the
file and all recorded proceedings for the case. (R., p.106.) The State filed a memorandum in
opposition to Mr. Youngman’s motion to suppress, arguing that: (1) the traffic stop was not
unlawfully prolonged because Sergeant Klitch had a “legal justification to expand the purpose of
the traffic stop to include a DUI investigation”; (2) “the K9 did not search the Defendant’s
vehicle . . . Any contact the K9 made with the Defendant’s vehicle was incident to the K9
following a scent emanating from within the Defendant’s vehicle, was spontaneous, and was not
5

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 from the preliminary hearing is contained in the electronic documented
titled “Exhibits Volume 1”.
5

at the direction of Officer Knisley”; and (3) “Sergeant Klitch possessed probable cause to believe
that the Defendant was driving the vehicle in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004.” (R., pp.11118.)
After the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court subsequently entered a
Memorandum Decision And Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Suppress. (R., pp.140-73.)
The district court concluded that: (1) “[t]he stop was not unlawfully prolonged by a DUI
investigation”; (2) “Officer Knisley did not allow her K-9 to conduct an actual search of the
vehicle”; and (3) “Sergeant Klitch had probable cause to arrest Youngman for DUI.”
(R., pp.146-73.) Based on the district court’s findings, the motion to suppress was denied.
(R., p.173.)
Thereafter, Mr. Youngman entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to
challenge the decision on his motion to suppress, to trafficking heroin by possessing more than
two grams but less than seven grams.6 (R., pp.201-03, 207.) The district court subsequently
sentenced Mr. Youngman to an executed sentence of four years, with three years fixed.
(R., pp.213-14.)

Mr. Youngman filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of

conviction. 7 (R., pp.215-18.)

6

The other charges and the persistent violator enhancement were dismissed pursuant to the plea
agreement. (R., pp.205-06, 208-09.)
7
Mr. Youngman does not challenge on appeal the district court’s conclusion that the motion to
suppress should be denied on the bases that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged by a DUI
investigation and that Officer Knisley did not allow her K-9 to conduct an actual search of the
vehicle.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Youngman’s motion to suppress when Sergeant Klitch
arrested him without probable cause?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Youngman’s Motion To Suppress When Sergeant
Klitch Arrested Him Without Probable Cause

A.

Introduction
Mr. Youngman argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion

because Sergeant Klitch arrested him without probable cause. Due to the unlawful arrest, the
district court should have suppressed any subsequently found evidence as fruit of his illegal
arrest.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). “The factual findings of a trial court in a criminal case ‘are
reviewed for clear error while the determination of whether the constitutional requirements have
been met is reviewed de novo.’ Such factual findings ‘should be overturned only if not supported
by substantial evidence.’” State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 461 P.3d 774, 783 (2020) (citations
omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.”
Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570.

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Youngman’s Motion To Suppress Because
Sergeant Klitch’s Arrest of Mr. Youngman Was Not Supported By Probable Cause
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

8

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

“The Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable search and
seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in original).
“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless the search falls within one
of the ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” State v. Blythe, 166 Idaho 713,
___, 462 P.3d 1177, 1180 (2020) (quoting State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 (1988)).
“One such exception to the warrant requirement is for searches conducted incident to an arrest.”
Id. (citing State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 649 (2017)). Evidence obtained in violation of Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution is subject to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho 981, 993 (1992). “[T]he exclusionary rule should be applied in order to: 1) provide an
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable government search
and/or seizure; 2) deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage
thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an additional
constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal means;
and 5) preserve judicial integrity.” Id.
An arrest must be based on probable cause to be lawful. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
816 (2009). “[A] warrantless arrest [is] lawful if the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe a felony had been committed or if the offender had committed a misdemeanor in the
presence of the officer.” State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451, 454 (2019). “Probable
cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in

9

believing that the offense has been [or is being] committed.”

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 816

(alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Judicial determination of

probable cause focuses on the information and facts the officers possessed at the time.” State v.
Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 921–22 (2007) (citing State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 823 (2004)).
“The facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint.”
State v. Islas, 165 Idaho 260, 443 P.3d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2019) (citing State v. Julian, 129
Idaho 133, 136 (1996)).
Here, Sergeant Klitch did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Youngman for driving
under the influence (“DUI”). Although the district court determined that Sergeant Klitch had
acquired reasonable suspicion for a DUI investigation after the stop, that standard “is
‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously
less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)
(quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). (R., pp.148-50.) The objective facts
present in this case did not establish the more demanding standard of probable cause for an
arrest.
The district court determined that Sergeant Klitch had probable cause to arrest
Mr. Youngman for driving under the influence of drugs based on its findings that
Mr. Youngman: (1) drove “well below the speed limit” at times when the officer was driving
beside him prior to initiating the traffic stop; (2) followed a vehicle in front of him too closely;
(3) crossed over the fog line while driving; (4) failed to maintain his lane while driving;8 (5) took

8

While the district court listed crossing over the fog line while driving and failing to maintain
lane separately, Sergeant Klitch wrote in his probable cause affidavit that “I caught up to the
Ford and observed the driver drive over the white solid fog line failing to maintain lane.”
(R., p.15.) At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Klitch stated that “I observed
10

approximately thirty-six second to pull over and come to a stop after the officer activated his
lights; (6) had extremely rapid speech; (7) failed to follow instructions on the Romberg test by
not telling Sergeant Klitch to stop counting the time that had elapsed; (8) failed the Romberg
test; (9) had two clues on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test; (10) had dilated pupils;
(11) had glassy and bloodshot eyes; (12) had needle marks on his arm; and (13) refused to take
all of the field sobriety tests.9 (R., pp.170-72.) These facts would not lead a reasonably prudent
officer to believe that Mr. Youngman was driving under the influence prior to his arrest.
Sergeant Klitch’s certification as a drug recognition expert had lapsed in 2015, so he was
not certified at the time of his encounter with Mr. Youngman. (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, L.20, L.12—
p.21, L.3.) Sergeant Klitch testified that he believed that Mr. Youngman was under the influence
of a central nervous system stimulant based off of Mr. Youngman’s “driving pattern, the physical
observations, and his performance on the Romberg test.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.24, Ls.2-8.) Sergeant
Klitch had Mr. Youngman perform the modified Romberg test to determine how closely
Mr. Youngman could estimate the passage of thirty seconds of time. (Tr. Vol. II, p.19, Ls.7-14,
p.22, L.23—p.24, L.1.) Sergeant Klitch noted that Mr. Youngman conducted the Romberg test
in sixteen seconds. (Tr. Vol. II, p.23, L.1—p.24, L.1.) While the Romberg test was being

Mr. Youngman failing to maintain his lane. He was driving on and over the white right fog
line.” (R., p.14, L.25—p.15, L.2.)
9
The district court also found that Mr. Youngman was speeding while driving. (R., p.170.)
Sergeant Klitch testified that Mr. Youngman was driving under the speed throughout the
officer’s observations prior to the stop, and there was no testimony provided at the motion to
suppress hearing or in the officer’s probable cause affidavit that indicated that the
Mr. Youngman was pulled over for speeding. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15, L.19—p.16, L.8; see R., p.15.)
“The factual findings of a trial court in a criminal case ‘are reviewed for clear error while the
determination of whether the constitutional requirements have been met is reviewed de novo.’
Such factual findings ‘should be overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence.’”
State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 461 P.3d 774, 783 (2020) (citations omitted). Mr. Youngman asserts
that there was no substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that Mr. Youngman
was speeding.
11

conducted, Sergeant Klitch also observed that Mr. Youngman had eyelid flutters during the
Romberg test. (Tr. Vol. II, p.23, Ls.1-9.)
The Romberg test is not a standardized field sobriety tests.10 Sergeant Klitch provided no
measure for determining the estimate passage of time at which the Romberg test would indicate
that a suspect is under the influence of a controlled substance. Likewise, Sergeant Klitch did not
provide any explanation at the motion to suppress hearing as to the significance of
Mr. Youngman having eyelid flutters during the Romberg test. Furthermore, Sergeant Klitch did
not explain how Mr. Youngman failing to say “stop” after he had estimated the passage of thirty
seconds for the Romberg test was indicative of Mr. Youngman being under the influence of a
controlled substance other than broadly stating that Mr. Youngman failed to follow the
instructions given. (Tr. Vol. II, p.48, L.2—p.49, L.18.) Instead, Sergeant Klitch claimed that
“the CNS stimulant speeds up the human body so your time is much faster -- typically much
faster for somebody that’s under the influence of a CNS stimulant.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.23, Ls.20-23.)
Given that Sergeant Klitch was no longer certified as a drug recognition expert and gave no
objective basis for measuring a suspect’s performance on the Romberg test, this Court should
limit the weight given, if any, to this test when determining whether Sergeant Klitch had
probable cause to arrest Mr. Youngman.
As for the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Sergeant Klitch only observed two clues when
conducting that test. (Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.21—p.27, L.18.) On cross-examination at the motion
to suppress hearing, Sergeant Klitch confirmed that four or more clues needed to be discovered
on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to indicate impairment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.49, Ls.22-25.) In
10

Sergeant Klitch testified that the standardized field sobriety tests “entail three standard tests:
The horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn and the one-leg stand.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.25,
L.21—p.26, L.3.) The probable cause affidavit submitted by Sergeant Klitch listed the sobriety
tests as “Gaze Nystagmus, Walk & Turn, and One Leg Stand.” (R., p.17.)
12

his probable cause affidavit, Sergeant Klitch checked the box indicating that Mr. Youngman did
not meet the necessary decision points for “Gaze Nystagmus.” (R., p.17.)
As for dilated pupils, Sergeant Klitch once again failed to identify at the motion to
suppress hearing what the significance, if any, that observation would have in determining
whether Mr. Youngman was under the influence. Sergeant Klitch acknowledged that he would
have needed a drug recognition expert face sheet and pupilometer to obtain an exact
measurement of Mr. Youngman’s pupils, and that he did not have those on him at the time of his
encounter with Mr. Youngman. (Tr. Vol. II, p.42, L.7—p.45, L.24.) Sergeant Klitch clarified
that a drug recognition would have to “measure the pupils, list the pupil size, continue the
evaluation, and then at the conclusion of the evaluation you would consider all the facts and
evidence that you’ve seen during that evaluation to make your determination.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.45,
Ls.2-18.) Even though Sergeant Klitch stated that he thought that Mr. Youngman’s pupils “were
bigger than they should’ve been based on the lighting conditions” and that he “believed they
were dilated”,11 those observations should be given little weight, if any, in determining whether
the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Youngman because (1) Sergeant Klitch was not
certified as a drug recognition expert at the time of the stop and (2) Sergeant Klitch failed to
complete an entire drug recognition expert evaluation that would have allowed him to make a
proper determination as to the significance of Mr. Youngman’s pupils.
Sergeant Klitch testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he was not sure as to
whether the presence of glassy or bloodshot eyes would indicate that someone was under the
influence of a central nervous system stimulant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.46, L.9—p.47, L.17.) Sergeant
Klitch also acknowledged that he was not sure at the time of the stop as to whether glassy or

11

Tr. Vol. II, p.42, L.7—p.45, L.24.
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bloodshot eyes would have been an indicator of central nervous system stimulant use. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.47, Ls.9-17.) Given that Sergeant Klitch was unsure as to whether bloodshot or glassy eyes
were indicative of the use of a central nervous system stimulant, and that there was no other
evidence submitted regarding this issue, the district court should have given little weight, if any,
to Mr. Youngman’s eyes during the stop.12
As for Mr. Youngman’s refusal to participate in some of the field sobriety tests,
Mr. Youngman acknowledges that the Court of Appeals of Idaho has held that:
[A] driver’s refusal to participate in field sobriety tests may be a factor in determining
whether probable cause exists that a driver is under the influence of alcohol, as the
refusal or evasion of field sobriety tests can infer a guilty conscience. Thompson v.
State, 138 Idaho 512, 515–16, 65 P.3d 534, 537–38 (Ct.App.2003). Because field
sobriety tests are used to either confirm or dispel an officer's reasonable suspicion that
a driver is under the influence of alcohol, just as performing poorly on such tests can
raise the level of suspicion to probable cause, the driver’s refusal to participate may
do the same.
State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2012). Regardless, Mr. Youngman
asserts that the facts present in this case would not lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe
that Mr. Youngman was driving under the influence prior to his arrest.
Sergeant Klitch did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Youngman for driving under
the influence. The facts known to Sergeant Klitch prior to the arrest would not lead a reasonably
prudent officer to believe Mr. Youngman had been driving under the influence at the moment of
his arrest. The police did not locate any controlled substances on Mr. Youngman’s person or in

12

In fact, Sergeant Klitch further acknowledged that glassy or bloodshot eyes, “could be a sign
in conjunction with other things, of somebody that could be under the influence of something.
Obviously there’s other things that can cause glassy, bloodshot eyes, so you know, it could be -it could be -- it could be in relation to controlled substance use or it could be caused by
something else.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.46, L.17—p.47, L.4.)
14

the car until after Mr. Youngman’s arrest.13 The exclusionary rule requires suppression at trial of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720
(2017) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841, 846 (2004).) The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both “primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” and, pertinent here, “evidence later
discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,” the proverbial “‘fruit of the poisonous
tree.’” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); accord, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 810–11 (2009). The district court erred by denying Mr. Youngman’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained following his illegal arrest.
While not raised in either parties’ briefing on the motion to suppress or argument at the
motion to suppress hearing, the district court concluded that “[a]t the moment his encounter with
Youngman began, and even before the DUI investigation had begun, Sergeant Klitch had
probable cause to arrest Youngman based on his driving status alone.”14

13

(R., p.148; see

The district court appears to have found that the drug dog alerted on Mr. Youngman’s vehicle
prior to his arrest. (R., pp.170-71.) “The factual findings of a trial court in a criminal case ‘are
reviewed for clear error while the determination of whether the constitutional requirements have
been met is reviewed de novo.’ Such factual findings ‘should be overturned only if not supported
by substantial evidence.’” State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 461 P.3d 774, 783 (2020) (citations
omitted). When stipulating to the admission of the videos for the hearing on the motion to
suppress, the State asserted that Defendant’s Exhibit A1 “shows the traffic stop all the way up
until the moment the defendant is about to be arrested.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.4-19.) Sergeant
Klitch testified that Mr. Youngman’s vehicle was searched approximately ten minutes after he
arrested Mr. Youngman and searched him incident to that arrest. (Tr. Vol. II, p.30, L.18—p.31,
L.1.) Officer Knisley ran her drug dog around Mr. Youngman’s vehicle approximately twelveand-one-half minutes after the conclusion of the video in Defendant’s Exhibit A1. (See
Defendant’s Exhibit A2 and Defendant’s Exhibit A3.) Mr. Youngman asserts that there was no
substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that the drug dog alerted prior to his
arrest.
14
The district court further concluded that “[w]ith a suspended license, to which Youngman
readily admitted, he could have been arrested, and likely would have been arrested.” (R., p.172.)
The State only argued below that “Sergeant Klitch possessed probable cause to believe the
15

R., pp.94-103, 111-18.)

In 2018, the Idaho legislature substantially overhauled the driving

without privileges statute, Idaho Code § 18-8001. In particular, the legislature added Idaho
Code § 18-8001(1)(b) to that statute, which states that:
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any motor vehicle upon
the highways of this state with knowledge or who has received legal notice
pursuant to section 49-320, Idaho Code, that his driver's license, driving
privileges or permit to drive is revoked, disqualified or suspended in this state or
any other jurisdiction and whose license was suspended for any reason outlined in
sections 18-1502, 49-326(1)(g), 49-1204 and 49-1207, Idaho Code, is guilty of an
infraction punishable by a fine of one hundred fifty dollars ($150).
Under Idaho Code § 18-8001(1)(b), there are certain driver’s license suspensions that may only
result in an infraction if a driver is suspended for those delineated reasons. An officer, therefore,
does not have the authority to arrest a driver if that driver’s license is suspended for one of the
reasons listed in Idaho Code § 18-8001(1)(b). See State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451,
454 (2019) (“[A] warrantless arrest [is] lawful if the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe a felony had been committed or if the offender had committed a misdemeanor in the
presence of the officer.”)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Klitch testified that he did not write
Mr. Youngman a ticket or citation for the traffic offenses or for driving while suspended.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.32, L.9—p.33, L.6.) Despite his statement to the contrary, Sergeant Klitch issued
Mr. Youngman an infraction citation for driving without privileges based on the investigation in
this case in case number CR28-20-2718.15 The district court’s conclusion that Sergeant Klitch
had probable cause to arrest Mr. Youngman for driving without privileges is not supported by the
Defendant was driving the vehicle in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004.” (R., p.118; see
Tr. Vol. II, p.101, L.6—p.104, L.21.)
15
It is especially troubling that Sergeant Klitch certified on the infraction citation from CR28-202718 that he had personally served that citation on Mr. Youngman while also stating under oath
in this case that the did not write Mr. Youngman a citation for driving without privileges. An
Infraction Default Judgment was subsequently issued against Mr. Youngman in CR28-20-2718.
16

record below. Even if this Court determines that Sergeant Klitch had probable cause to arrest
Mr. Youngman for driving without privileges, the totality of the circumstances present in this
case demonstrate that an arrest for driving without privileges was not going to occur and there
was no evidence or argument presented below that would have justified a search incident to
arrest for the offense of driving without privileges based on officer safety or evidence
preservation. See State v. Blythe, 166 Idaho 713, 462 P.3d 1177, 1180-84 (2020).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Youngman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 21st day of April, 2021.
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